Truth in postmodern philosophy: absolute vs. relative truth

Abstract

The discourse on truth in postmodern philosophy revolves around the tension between absolute and relative conceptions of truth, reflecting a significant shift from modernist faith in universal rationality to postmodern skepticism toward grand narratives. Classical philosophy and Enlightenment thought privileged absolute truth as objective, timeless, and independent of human perspectives, a view central to science and metaphysics. Postmodern thinkers, however, reject such universality, emphasizing the relativity of truth as shaped by cultural, linguistic, and historical contexts. Nietzsche’s critique of objective facts, Foucault’s power/knowledge framework, Derrida’s deconstruction of meaning, and Lyotard’s incredulity toward metanarratives all highlight truth’s instability and multiplicity. While this relativist turn opens space for pluralism and marginalized voices, it also raises concerns about nihilism, moral relativism, and the erosion of universal justice, prompting critiques from philosophers like Habermas. Thus, the debate between absolute and relative truth in postmodern thought remains central to contemporary discussions of knowledge, ethics, and human coexistence.